Natural Information, Factivity and Nomicity by Ben, Baker
Natural Information, Factivity and Nomicity
Ben Baker
Abstract
Biological and cognitive sciences rely heavily on the idea of infor-
mation transmitted between natural events or processes. This paper
critically assesses some current philosophical views of natural informa-
tion and defends a view of natural information as Nomic and Factive.
Dretske (1981) offered a Factive view of information, and recent work
on the topic has tended to reject this aspect of his view in favor of a
non-Factive, probabilistic approach. This paper argues that the rea-
soning behind this move to non-Factivity is flawed and mixes up dif-
ferent problems with Dretske’s original view. I show that one of these
problems – strictness – has to do with Nomicity rather than Factivity.
The other problem – reference class ambiguity – is not solvable just
in terms of a theory of natural information. On the Dretske-inspired
view I defend, natural information is Factive and Nomic but is insuf-
ficient to determine the cognitive or biological content of a natural
process. In sum I present an examination what natural information is
and what role it can (and cannot) play in our understanding of living
and thinking things.
1 Introduction
Natural information plays a crucial role in our scientific understanding of
many of the most interesting and puzzling phenomena we find. The notion
of information being carried by, and transmitted among states or processes
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in the observable, natural world is essential in standard approaches to the
study of genetics, nervous systems, and complex organismal behavior. It is
largely in terms of the information carried by animal behaviors, strands of
DNA, and neural activity that a scientific picture of biological and cognitive
phenomena gets filled in. Given that natural information is supposed to play
such a crucial role, and given the goal-directed or intentional character of
many of the things it is supposed to help analyze, it is a difficult task to spell
out precisely what natural information is.
Current accounts of natural information typically take a critical stance
with respect to a view offered by Dretske (1981). Dretske’s work did much
to set the present stage for theories of how the content of perceptions and
beliefs states might derive from flows of information. Dretske’s view has two
notable shortcomings, one being that it is too strict and the other being that
it fails to provide a way of determining the reference classes of information-
carrying states. The charge that it is too strict says Dretske’s view implies
that a many mundane but important cases of information transmission are
not cases of information transmission at all. The reference class problem
arises from the fact that the information in a signal can only be specified
with respect to a determinate range of possibilities and probabilities, and
Dretske’s view cannot settle what the relevant ranges are in a given case.
However, I will argue that the prevailing critical response has misjudged the
source of these problems, and that the widespread view of information that
results from this misjudgment is confused and lacks the explanatory power
that it claims to offer.
A basic aspect of Dretske’s view that current approaches typically reject is
that it holds natural information to be Factive. The Factivity of information
means that information pertains to actually existing states or properties, or
in other words information indicates what, in fact, happens. Recent analy-
sis of natural information adopt a non-Factive approach on which, broadly,
information pertains to probability distributions among possible states or
properties. The rejection of Factivity is alleged to help address the problems
with Dretske’s account [20, 31, 33]. However, the reasoning behind these ap-
proaches conflates the strictness and reference class problems. I argue that
the move to non-Factivity does not make any progress on the reference class
problem and is irrelevant to the strictness problem. The strictness problem
is rooted not in Factivity but in Dretske’s overly simple conception of Laws
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of Nature. This problem can be remedied by modifying Dretske’s view to
incorporate a more nuanced notion of Nomicity (roughly speaking, physical
necessity) that is sensitive to the way initial conditions constrain invariant
relationships in nature. The reference class problem is not to be solved by
any view of natural information, because it is has not to do with what natural
information is, but rather it has to do with what makes certain information
explanatorily relevant. Fully appreciating the reference class problem means
appreciating where information theory falls short of determining the semantic
content that figures in our understanding of biological and cognitive beings.
Non-Factive theories of natural information actually exacerbate the refer-
ence class problem by massively expanding the space of possible reference
classes. In practice, Non-Factive theories obscure the reference class prob-
lem, which encourages information-based science that is out of touch with the
goal-directed and intentional phenomena of interest. The Dretske-inspired
view of information I defend here presents an escape from this confusion and,
if adequately supplemented by theoretical resources outside of information
theory, can underpin our understanding of the natural occurrence of enti-
ties that aim, pursue, avoid, plan, imagine, and more - that is, the natural
occurrence of intentionality
I proceed as follows: in section 2, I offer a condensed version of Dretske’s
view of natural information, and then briefly review several accounts that,
in contrast to Dretske, hold information to be non-Factive. I highlight the
way that the reasoning offered in favor of the non-Factive views relies on the
fact that information-using systems can make mistakes. In section 3, I exam-
ine the idea of Law-like or Nomic regularities in nature. I articulate a view
of Nomicity that reveals the importance of specific initial conditions associ-
ated with any Nomic regularity. This addresses the strictness problem with
Dretske’s view. In section 4, I argue that the critical reaction to a Factive
view of information is based on flawed reasoning; in essence, it tries explicitly
to solve the strictness problem, but using unnecessary means, and it ignores
the reference class problem, which is actually the deeper puzzle highlighted
by consideration of mistake-cases. In section 5, I offer a definition of natural
information as Factive and Nomic, supported by the preceding discussion.
I then clarify how uncertainty and probability figure in natural information
understood in this way. Finally, I show how this Factive approach can better
serve the scientific investigation of goal-oriented and intentional systems.
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2 Dretske’s Theory and the Non-Factive Re-
sponse
2.1 Factivity and Lawfulness
Dretske aimed to provide for an understand of how perception and knowledge
arise from information flowing between the environment and the brain [9].
The account of this information flow expanded on the notion of information
developed by Claude Shannon, Norbert Weiner and others [32]. The Shan-
non model provides mathematical means for calculating stochastic entropy,
which has deep ties to the considerably older, thermodynamic notion of en-
tropy. The entropy of Shannon information is usefully glossed as a measure
of ”uncertainty reduction” [3,21]. Consider the sense in which the result of a
coin-flip measurably reduces uncertainty in a lesser degree than the result of
tossing a six-sided die - the former reduces two possibilities to one, while the
latter reduces six possibilities to one. This is the sense in which the Shannon
model says the former result is less informative than the latter. Appreciating
the mathematical details of the Shannon model is not important for this dis-
cussion. The philosophical questions to do with understanding information
as natural are beyond the scope of the Shannon model. Since Shannon in-
formation is purely a formal measure, it does not say anything to distinguish
between a kind of information that is to be found in the nature as opposed to
information that is represented in thought or speech. Dretske’s concern was
to account for information as a natural phenomenon such that it would allow
him to naturalistically account for the representational nature of thought.1
Dretske’s view of information-carrying signals involves two important con-
ditions, Factivity and Lawfulness . I will focus on Factivity for now, and
discuss Lawfulness later. Dretske partly expressed Factivity by reference to
Grice’s notion of ”natural meaning” [15], and by a deliberate use of the word
”indicate.” In these terms, smoke is an informational signal of fire insofar as it
indicates a fire. By contrast, linguistic utterances and conventional signs are,
in general, non-Factive. For example, the utterance ”there is a fire” and a
1Going forward I will usually refer simply to ”information” without the ”natural”
qualifier, trusting that my meaning will be clear from context
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ringing fire-alarm may not indicate a fire - the speaker of the utterance could
be mistaken or lying, and the alarm could have been triggered by a prankster
or an electrical malfunction. In such misleading cases, Dretske’s view is that
the utterance and alarm do not carry information about a fire. In his words,
”false information and mis-information are not kinds of information - any
more than decoy ducks and rubber rucks are kinds of ducks” (1981, 45). Of
course, we sometimes speak of false information or mis-information, but this
involves using a non-natural sense of ”information,” according to Dretske.
The contrast between the Factivity of information and the non-Factivity
of certain mental states, especially beliefs, is what sets up the central philo-
sophical challenge that Dretske takes on in his 1981 book and several later
works. He aims to account for how Factive, informational states of the brain,
appropriately related to the world, could help explain non-Factive states like
beliefs. In this context, ”states like beliefs” broadly amounts to representa-
tions that are characterized by a norm of accuracy or truth and that can fail
to meet this norm. In such degenerate cases, like false beliefs, the represen-
tation is a misrepresentation [10]. In other words, these representations have
content that is ”trying to get the world right,” and which may actually get
it wrong, while informational states are never ”wrong” about the part of the
world about which they are informative.2.
Slightly rewording the phrasing on 65 and 76-77 of Dretske (1981), I offer
the following statement of Dretske’s Theory (DT) of natural information:
DT: A signal, b’s being in state N, carries the informa-
tion that s is in state F, if and only if (i) the conditional
probability that s is in state F, given that b is in state N,
is equal to 1; (ii) this conditional probability relation is
fixed by some Law(s) of Nature.
Elaborating further, some part or process in nature, s, is a source of in-
formation, which can manifest various states, among which one is F. For
example, s might be a region of space-time that can either exhibit a fire,
F, or a non-fire, G. The event of b’s being N is also a source of informa-
2This is one way of roughly stating ”the problem of Intentionality,” which has concerned
quite a few philosophers besides Dretske [19]
5
Figure 1: b’s being in state N carries information about s’s being in state
F. Smaller, grey boxes and vertical ellipses represent possible counterfactual
manifestations of s and b. The double line between s and b represents
the non-accidental relation between them; according to DT, it represents a
constraint of some Law(s) of Nature.
tion (since b could have been other than N ), but here we are not interested
in that event as a source but rather as a signal of some other source. For
example, b might be a region of space-time that can manifest smoke, N, or
not-smoke, O. More relevantly, b might be part of a brain that can exhibit
various patterns of neural activity.
Factivity is entailed by DT’s first condition, in the required probability of
1. In other words, (i) entails that N indicates F. Since a signal is construed
as one among a definite set of possible states of a source, it is more precise
to say ”b being in state N ” carries information, and somewhat misleading to
say ”N ” (all by itself) carries information, but I will sometimes use the less
precise phrasing below, for brevity.
The second condition of DT expresses Dretske’s Lawfulness requirement
on information. More generally, (ii) is a version of a non-accident condition.
That is, Lawfulness is meant to support the idea that some correlations that
are the result of pure chance - mere coincidences or accidents - which are not
information-carrying. To illustrate, suppose that there is an ordinary coin
that, when tossed many times in an ordinary way, happens to land heads on
every single toss. Call this coin ”s” and substitute ”is F ” for the predicate
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”is tossed.” Call the event of this coin landing ”b,” and substitute ”is N ” for
the predicate, ”lands heads.” In such a case there is an observable, perfect
correlation between the coin being tossed and the coin landing heads. This
is an example of an accidental correlation because, insofar as it involves fair
coin tosses, the correlation does not reflect the actual ”fairness” of the coin.
This correlation does not reflect the physical tendency of the coin to exhibit
a certain (distribution of) behavior. The ”conditional probability” in DT is
meant in the sense that one would say the probability of the coin landing
heads is .5, conditional on it being tossed in the air. By contrast, on a simple
reading of the ”Law of Gravity,” the probability that two entities in otherwise
empty space will approach each other is 1, conditional on them each having
some mass. Pointing out intuitive examples of accidental correlations, like
streaks of lucky coinflips, does very little the characterize the correlations
that are based in information flow, so Dretske looks to Laws of Nature for
this purpose, which is rendered by (ii).
It is not self-evident what should be counted among the laws of nature, or
which conditional probabilities are determined by those Laws, but the appeal
to Laws at least seems to say more than an appeal to ”non-accidentalness”
alone. For instance, one might reasonably suppose that some Law(s) of
Nature ensure correlations between fires and smoke plumes, and that no
natural law underwrites the fact that a particular coin lands heads every
time it is tossed. 3
To preface a later discussion, it is worth briefly noting one thing Dretske
says about why he invokes Laws of Nature. He claims that the important
thing laws do (that accidents do not) is determine the truth of counterfactual
statements. For example, ”if there had been a fire, there would have been
smoke” is the kind of claim Dretske relies on Laws for. In his words, ”[L]aws
have a modal quality (they tell us what must be the case or what cannot
happen) that is absent from simple statements of exceptionless correlations.”
3Dretske actually uses different phrases to connote non-accidentalness in different
places, and some of these are weaker-sounding than (ii). At times he speaks broadly
of ”nomic dependence” (1981, 75-76). He also relies considerably on an example where
informational relations are fixed by conventions among regular partners in a card game
(70), which seems not to involve Lawful correlations in the strong sense DT suggests. Still,
Dretske does explicitly appeal to Laws at times, and I believe DT reflects how Dretske’s
approach has generally been received by others in this literature.
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(ibid, 77).
Now, with Dretske’s theory in hand, let us turn to some dissenting views.
2.2 Garden Variety Correlations
A prevailing criticism of Dretske’s (1981) account of information transmission
is that it is too strict [11,14,20,25,31,33]. In short, these critics argue that DT
rules out many clear cases of information transmission, including exactly the
sort of cases that are supposed to be relevant to a naturalistic understanding
intentionality and knowledge.
Ruth Millikan (2004) gives clear expression to the reasoning underlying
the common critical reaction to DT [26]. She argues that, insofar as people
and animals seem to cognitively rely on information signals, these seem not
to be signals that carry a lawfully guaranteed indication of some state of the
world. To illustrate, she considers the example of a rabbit who hears that
there is a predator in its immediate environment. This is an important sort
of case since all parties here agree that information about the presence of
the fox is carried by its body, transmitted through various structures in the
air - light patterns, sound waves, airborne chemicals, etc. - and eventually
transmitted to some neural activity in the rabbit. This is supposed to help
explain how the rabbit has some intentional state about the fox. Millikan
has the following to say about such a case:
”[N]o natural law can require it to be a predator that
causes [a rabbit’s] predator detectors to fire. Whatever
information channel she uses, it is always nomically pos-
sible that non-predators should exist who would activate
it. Suppose for the sake of the argument (though very
implausibly) that there are unbreakable natural laws that
concern the effects of foxes on rabbit sense organs. Still,
there are surely no laws that nothing else could possibly
produce these same effects on the rabbit sense organs.”
(2004, p.33)
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In Millikan’s view, taking N to be any activity of a rabbit’s brain you
like, it must be possible for N to be caused in the absence of any fox, say, by
something that looks, sounds, or smells like a fox. Millikan’s basic conclusion
is that DT is untenably strict because it cannot substantiate basic cases like
that of a rabbit’s brain carrying information as to the presence of predators.
Nicholas Shea enlists Millikan’s reasoning in arguing that it is ”correla-
tional information” that underlies intentional content, as opposed to infor-
mation as defined by DT [33]. Importantly, the relevant ”correlations” can
be imperfect ones, so Shea’s notion of information is non-Factive. He makes
this clear when he says ”instances of a type [] R which carries correlational
information about C can be tokened even when C does not obtain” (420).
(To translate, change ”R” to ”b is in state N ” and change ”C” to ”s is
in state F ”). So, according to Shea, the rabbit’s brain state, N can carry
information about a predator being around even when, in fact, there is no
predator around, provided the relevant correlation exists. This is supposed
to help explain how it is possible for the rabbit to have an intentional state
whose content does not line up with the facts, that is, how the rabbit can
misrepresent things.
Shea’s view also includes a non-accident condition. He does not refer to
”laws of nature” but says that the relevant correlations are fixed by some
”common natural reason.” This seems to be a weaker requirement than (ii)
in DT, but Shea does not offer a detailed account of what a common natural
reason is. The main point here is that the correlations Shea’s view relies on
are not meant to be mere frequencies, as in the earlier case of a streak of coin-
flips landing heads. Rather, Shea wants to rely on ”objective” probabilities,
”like the 50 percent chance that a lump of 4.5 billion atoms of uranium-238
will emit an alpha particle in a year” (ibid).
Even assuming the probabilities associated with atomic radioactivity are
universal, it is much less clear how to make sense of more relevant cases. How
does one assess the ”objective probability” that some non-predator causes
pattern N in a rabbit’s brain? Is the probability determined by all the
non-predators in the universe capable of making it the case that b is in
state N, under all possible circumstances? That is implausible, since there
are an incomprehensibly large number of non-predators with that capacity,
so such a calculation would not yield the information that we antecedently
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suppose the rabbit relies on. Anyway most of those non-predators seem not
to commonly or naturally interact with rabbit brains, which suggests Shea
means to exclude them from consideration. However, if we are to relativize
to some non-universal domain in order to determine the relevant probability
- say, considering only events on Earth, or in the rabbit’s local habitat, or in
the habitat of its progenitors - this immediately raises the question of why
that relativization fixes the ”objective” probability relevant to the rabbit’s
intentional state.
This sort of worry about the appropriate relativization or reference class
is notorious, and will feature in this discussion in several places [17, 18]. In
section 4 I try to clarify the significance of this problem for a view of natural
information.
2.3 Probabilistic Information
Andrea Scarantino and Gualtiero Piccinini offer the most sustained and direct
argument I have found against Factivity [31],and Scarantino (2015) presents
a detailed theory of information as a ”probabilistic difference-maker” [30].
Kraemer also rejects condition (i) of DT and defends an account of prob-
abilistic information [20]. Like Shea’s, their views are explicitly motivated
by observing that information-users sometimes respond to signals that do
not indicate whatever the response appears to be a response to. On this
score, Scarantino and Piccinini say ”[o]rganisms do make mistakes, after all.
Some mistakes are due precisely to the reception of probabilistic informa-
tion about events that fail to obtain” (2010, 319). Probabilistic information
content is thus not a fact, but is rather the extent to which a possibility is
more or less probable. Kraemer also points to the problematic strictness of
Dretske’s account and proposes that ”many natural signs carry information
about the probabilities of certain occurrences” (2015a, 145). For instance,
these philosophers would suggest that the rabbit’s brain-state, N, might just
carry the information that there is a predator around with some probability,
p, whether or not a predator is actually there.
Scarantino and Piccinini’s notion of probability also contains a non-accident
condition in terms of ”reliability;” only reliable correlations count for the pur-
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poses of probabilistic information. Also, Scarantino’s (2015) use of the term
”difference-maker” suggests a requirement on informational relations that
shares at least a family resemblance with condition (ii) of DT. Exploring the
”difference-maker” idiom in depth is beyond the present scope, but I note
that, intuitively, whether there is fire makes a difference to whether there is
smoke whereas whether a certain coin has landed heads many times in the
past does not make a difference to whether it will land heads on a particular
future toss 4. Scarantino and Piccinini, like Shea, avoid appealing to laws of
nature but do not precisely articulate what distinguishes the non-accidental
(reliable) correlations as such. Scarantino and Piccinini say that reliable cor-
relations are the sort that ”information users can count on to hold in some
range of future and counterfactual circumstances,” and largely leave it at
that (2010, 318).
In Scarantino’s (2015) theory, an informational signal implies an incremen-
tal change in the probability of an event relative to a prior probability, where
this prior is fixed by certain background data. So, strictly speaking, a signal
like b’s being in state N is not said to carry information as to how probable
it is that a predator is nearby, but rather information as to how much more
or less likely it is that a predator is nearby, compared to some baseline. This
will sound a lot like Bayesian confirmation theory to those familiar with it,
because it is. Scarantino’s view aims to smoothly incorporate the insights of
Bayesianism alongside a Shannon-inspired measure of information. Here is
his formulation (2015, 423):
Incremental Natural Information (INI): b’s being
in state N carries information about s ’s being in state F,
relative to background data d, if and only if Pr(s is F | b is N) 6=
Pr(s is F | D)
The vital role played by background data in INI illuminates the relativiza-
tion issue that is obscured in an unadorned appeal to objective probability.
According to INI, what information N carries in a rabbit’s brain depends
directly on what the background data is. Of course, how to identify the
relevant background data is non-trivial. Again, I leave deeper examination
ofthis issue for section 4.
4see [36] on difference-making
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2.4 Signalling Games
There are deep parallels between the puzzle about the intentional content
of cognitive states and one about how to determine the content of the com-
municative behavior of living things. Animals, plants and even bacteria
manifest behaviors that appear to serve as signals to other creatures (espe-
cially conspecifics), which might allow those creatures to find food, realize
reproductive opportunities, or avoid predators [24, 35]. These behaviors are
described in both scientific and informal contexts as signs that communicate
contents along the lines of ”food is over here,” or ”I am your potential mate,”
or ”danger from above.” What determines this content?
Brian Skyrms’ theory of the information content of biological signals uses
a game-theoretic framework, building on the work of David Lewis [23, 34].
Lewis was analyzing the meanings associated with actions in a ”signalling
game.” In rudimentary form, such a game involves two players, ”Sender” and
”Receiver,” who each get certain payoffs (or incur costs) that depend on both
the state of the world and on their actions. One round of the game goes as
follows: only Sender observes the state of the world, then Sender chooses an
action, then Receiver observes Sender’s choice and must choose an action.
Receiver’s choice given the state of the world determines the payoffs that
Sender and Receiver realize. Lewis’ key insight is that sometimes, given the
right arrangement of possible actions and payoffs, Sender’s rational (payoff-
maximizing) strategy is one that allows Receiver to learn something about the
state of the world from Sender’s choice. That is, it can be to Sender’s benefit
to correlate her actions with what she observes, allowing Receiver to do better
than randomly guess the state of the world. (This requires the typical game-
theoretic assumptions that the available options and the rationality of the
players are common knowledge among them). Lewis uses this approach to
try to account for the meanings of conventional signals, especially linguistic
ones. Skyrms draws on this approach to develop a theory of the content of
communications in the biological realm generally.
One oft-discussed example of animal communication is that of vervet mon-
key alarm calls, which differ depending on the type of predator that a monkey
sees, and allow monkeys in earshot to flee to bushes, or treetops, or wherever
is most appropriate for a specific type of predator. In short, vervets seem
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to warn each other as to which predators are around. To simplify for the
purposes of describing this case in terms of a signalling game as per Skyrms,
suppose the range of possible states of the world is ”Snake,” ”Eagle,” and ”No
Predator.” Suppose also that Sender monkey, who sees the world state, can
take three different actions (calls), and that a Receiver monkey, who hears
the call, can also take three different actions. Finally, suppose that each state
of the world is associated with a single high-payoff option for Receiver, so
there is a clear best choice given each state. Depending on Sender’s payoffs,
her optimal strategy might involve correlating her different calls with the dif-
ferent states in a way that supports Receiver taking a strategy of correlating
his actions with her calls, thereby reliably getting high payoffs.
Skyrms’ view is that biological signals like alarm calls carry information
insofar as a Receiver’s actions warrant attributing to the Receiver an implicit
probability assignment as to the state of the world, conditioned on the re-
ceived signal. Skyrms’ information content is thus a vector of probabilities
over possible states. For example, [p, q, (1-p-q)] could be a vector describing
the information in an alarm call, where p is the probability assigned to Snake
and q is the probability assigned to Eagle, and No Predator is the remainder.
Importantly, this model does not require perfect correlation between Sender
actions and states of the world, so these vectors involve probabilities less than
1. In other words, Sender can (at least in some relevant cases) be expected
to employ a ”mixed strategy,” where she sometimes takes different actions
for the same state of the world. This renders the ”message” in her actions
somewhat ambiguous as to the state of the world. For instance, Sender’s
strategy could be to have one call that is highly correlated with snake but
that she occasionally uses in the No Predator state, as it could occasionally
be in her interest for Receiver to act as though there is a Snake when there
is none. This illustrates how information content can fail to indicate the
state of the world, on this approach. The non-Factivity of this approach is
also plain from the way information content is roughly equated to Receiver’s
guess about the state of the world - the relationship between the received
signal and the world is mediated by what Sender chooses, having observed
the world.
On Skyms’ view, information is relativized to a game theoretical model
in a way analogous to how, in Scarantino’s account, it is relativized to a
particular set of background data. This is because the information content
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in a biological signal is determined by the details of the game used to model
the phenomenon. Which game models are appropriate to which biological
phenomena is a separate, difficult question, which looks a lot like the reference
class problem. Also, in specifying that the players play payoff-maximizing
strategies given common knowledge, one effectively stipulates the relevant
modal facts (such as what Sender would have done if she had seen a different
state) so the question of whether accidents carry information does not arise
on this approach.
I have now surveyed several non-Factive views of information and noted
how each relies on a kind of reference class and on the exclusion of merely
accidental correlations. I now shift focus to ”non-accidentalness” itself, which
will let me spell out the view of information I defend.
3 Non-Accidentalness as Nomicity
3.1 What Matters is Modality
Recall that Dretske was motivated to rely on laws of nature as a way of
determining the truth of counterfactual claims. Similarly, Scarantino and
Piccinini expound on the ”reliability” of a correlation by pointing to what
would happen in some counterfactual cases, and Shea also suggests that
”common natural reasons” underwrite relevant counterfactuals. So there is
some consensus here that the important difference between accidental and
non-accidental covariance is the counterfactual implications that come with
the latter. Everyone here agrees, for instance, that if smoke carries informa-
tion about fire, the smoke-fire covariance implies the following: if there were
no smoke there would be no fire (or at least, fire would be less probable than
if there were smoke). By contrast, the fact that a certain coin has landed
heads 100 times in a row does not imply that the 100th toss would have
(probably) landed heads even if it had been tossed somewhat differently.
A reason to think counterfactual implications are required of information-
bearing entities is that this makes sense of the potentially guiding or re-
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vealing character of information. This is expressed by Dretske’s claim that
information is what one can learn from a signal, and expressed by Scarantino
and Piccinini’s claim that reliable correlations can be ”counted on,” and ex-
pressed by the much older idea that objective probabilities must be a ”guide
to life” [4,5]. Information must be presumed to be bound up with the coun-
terfactual structure of the natural world, or it would not help explain the way
information-users accurately aim at things, reliably predict things, correctly
infer things, etc. In short, counterfactual implications make information use-
ful.
One might hope to avoid worrying about non-accidentalness by construing
information directly in terms of the relevant counterfactuals, avoiding any
reference to Laws or physical necessity or probability. Cohen and Meskin
(2006) take this approach. Their basic thesis can be stated as follows:
Counterfactual Theory of Information (CTI): b’s
being N carries information about s ’s being F if and only
if the counterfactual ”if s were not F, then b would not be
N ” is non-vacuously true. (335)
The qualification ”non-vacuously” is meant to block the implication that
information is always carried by any signal about any necessary condition.
Without this qualification, for instance, CTI would imply that every signal
carries the information that 2+2=4.
CTI is a Factive notion of information, in that b’s being N and s ’s being
F are construed as actual events (ibid., footnote 2). Note also that anything
that carries DT-information carries CTI-information, given the counterfac-
tual implications of laws of nature. However, the converse may not hold.
CTI is a weaker thesis than DT in that it does not commit to laws of nature
as determining the truth of the relevant counterfactuals. CTI is silent about
what makes the counterfactuals non-vacuously true. This silence makes CTI
unsatisfying in the present context. Because the truth of relevant counter-
factual statements is simply asserted, the ”guiding” or ”revealing” character
of information is left as something of a mystery. To ask ”In virtue of what
do these counterfactuals hold?” is to ask about non-accidentalness, which
CTI offers no view of. If not by appeal to laws of nature, some other posi-
tive notion of non-accidentalness is needed to say where the counterfactual
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implications of information come from.
I will now argue that a careful understanding of physical necessity, i.e.,
law-like invariance i.e., Nomicity is the relevant, positive notion of non-
accidentalness. To facilitate my discussion of Nomicity, I want to consider
three variants of an example I will call Thermometer Information:
A. In a typical thermometer, a volume of mercury, V, linearly covaries at
rate r with the temperature, T, of the surrounding space. (V carries
information about T )
B. A volume of mercury, V, linearly covaries at rate r with the tempera-
ture, T2, of a location on a different planet. (V does not carry infor-
mation about T2 )
C. In the vacuum of outer space there is a volume of (quite solid) mercury,
V, which does not linearly covary with the surrounding temperature,
T3. (V does not carry information about T3 )
One can make uncontroversial judgments about the relevant informational
relations in these cases, which I stated in parentheses. What we want to
know is why they are the right judgments. Case (A) is a standard one
of non-accidental covariation. Case (B), by contrast, exemplifies accidental
covariation - the relationship is ”mere chance.” Case (C) involves some mer-
cury and a surrounding temperature - apparently the same kind of entities as
in (A) - but the linear covariation is missing because the mercury is frozen.
Thus, it appears the non-accidental relationship that fixes information trans-
mission in (A) must not hold in (C). But one might have thought that non-
accidental, information-fixing relationships hold everywhere and always. So
what gives? Surely a standard thermometer carries information about the
temperature, but what determines the conditions of this information-carrying
relationship? Note that we cannot even say that the generalization in (A)
holds ”usually” or ”on average” if those are interpreted in basic physical
terms, since much more of the universe is below mercury’s freezing point
than above it. Of course, ”usually on Earth” is another matter, but why
would non-accidentalness itself, insofar as it determines the content of nat-
ural information, be relativized in such a way? Again the reference class
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problem rears its head. To get clear about what information is transmitted
where, we need a more exact view of non-accidentalness.
3.2 Law-Like Invariance, Nomicity
Laws of nature are supposed to describe regularities of the most general and
fundamental kind, so it would be nice if information was determined by such
laws. Since information is supposed to inhere in the structure of nature itself,
flowing among nature’s parts before any intelligent being opts to make use
of it, any laws governing the operations of all of those parts would be safe
ground on which to base a theory of natural information. The problem is that
it is extremely implausible that, as Millikan put it, laws of nature concern
the effect of foxes on rabbit sense organs.
Even if laws of nature do not concern things as specific as rabbit brains,
the idea that laws are perfectly general regularities, nowhere and never ad-
mitting of exceptions, is too simplistic. Such a simplistic view is suggested
by the way philosophers have often described laws as logical schema, espe-
cially as universally quantified conditional statements [1,8,37]. For example,
a classical statement of a law might be ”all smoke comes from fire,” or ”if am-
bient temperature increases by X, the volume of mercury increases by X*r.”
Thinking of these as expressing laws fits with a view of laws as universally
applicable, but such a view is not tenable. As I illustrate below, having a
clear view of the significance of initial conditions in laws of nature allows
for a clearer view of Nomicity as non-accidentalness, which resolves the kind
of puzzle brought out by Thermometer Information. For more thorough ac-
counts of laws that clearly lay out their non-universality, see [6, 22, 38], and
for analyses specifically of the important pairing of initial conditions with
statements of laws, see [2, 7, 12, 39].
The most widely agreed on examples of laws of nature describe how the
simplest physical quantities interact, and they are typically expressed in the
mathematical terms that make up our most general models of the physical
universe. Laws of this sort come with a range of initial conditions - conditions
in which we might observe the system being described and under which the
law is expected to hold. There are parts of the universe we have measured
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that exhibit extreme conditions that exceed the bounds assumed by state-
ments of laws (like immediately after the Big Bag), and parts of the universe
we have not measured that are theorized to lie outside these bounds as well
(like the inside of a Black Hole). General Relativity, for example, is thought
not to apply over the smallest measurable distances due to quantum effects,
and at very high energy scales the Strong, Weak, and Electromagnetic Forces
appear not to behave remotely like our models of them would have it [39].
If a model of some interacting physical quantities needed to accurately de-
scribe things in literally every condition in the universe in order to be a law
of nature, then we would have no such model.
Laws are typically formulated by scientists as (systems of) differential equa-
tions, which differ from universally quantified conditionals in several impor-
tant ways. These differential equations involve variables that mutually shape
the way the variables change over time. Each variable represents some as-
pect of nature and can take a wide range of values while still supporting
the invariant relationship specified by the equation(s). What a law says is
invariant is the relationship among the variables specified by the equation(s)
- what is invariant is not a generalization about concrete, observable entities.
Such generalizations, like ”smoke comes from fire,” can be thought of as be-
ing described by certain combinations of certain values of the variables that
figure in a law. This means that a lawful invariance can be realized in starkly
different ways, which are represented by starkly different solutions to the dif-
ferential equation(s). It does not make sense to think of all of these possible
solutions as ”instances” of an (absurdly convoluted) conditional statement,
because the solutions range over phenomena that are so qualitatively diverse.
Crucially, differential equations typically only have solutions when the vari-
ables fall within certain ranges; roughly put, if one value is too high or low,
there is no guarantee that the rest of the values can be filled in so as to make
the equation(s) hold. In sum, the mathematical statements in physics which
have most claim to ”law” status can be expected not to apply to certain
situations where some initial condition is not met.
To further illustrate, if there were a law concerning the relationship be-
tween the volume of mercury and the surrounding temperature, it might
specify that the two variables, V and T, do perfectly covary at rate C un-
der a range of initial conditions. These conditions would be exceeded in
the vacuum of space, which would explain why the law does not apply in
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case (C) of Thermometer Information. However, our broadest theories of
the physical universe do not include laws specifically about mercury and
surrounding temperature. Rather, the law(s) relevant to that case involve
highly general equations with variables whose values can describe both solid
and liquid mercury, and countless other measurable kinds of stuff. These
laws hold both in typical households and in the vacuums of space, and so
the invariance described by the relevant equations is manifest both in the
observable covariance in (A) and in the lack thereof in (C). This is somewhat
opaque because to represent what is invariant across these two cases requires
a degree of physical abstraction and precision that is difficult or impossible
to achieve in a spoken language (which is one reason calculus is important).
Most of the regularities that we talk about and that inform how we live our
lives are like that in (A): they are law-like insofar as they involve invariances
over a range of initial conditions, but compared to the invariances commonly
dubbed ”laws of nature” they are far less general. These prosaic regularities
have a much narrower domain of application than Laws and are less theo-
retically relevant for the empirical study of other very broad generalizations.
The difference here is a matter of degree.
Recognizing the non-universality of laws allows one to appreciate the sense
in which they are of-a-kind with regularities in all manner of domains other
than that of making highly abstract models of physical systems. Covariance
between smoke and fire, between foxes and rabbit brains, and between fun-
damental particles all share the feature of being invariant under a range of
initial conditions. The point is that this is all one should mean by ”physically
necessary” or ”Nomic.” A law is guaranteed to hold in a very wide range of
conditions, but any other pattern of covariation is no less physically necessary
because it is only guaranteed in rare circumstances. A striking correlation
among the outcomes of successive flips of a coin is rightly regarded as ran-
dom or accidental insofar as it was not guaranteed under the conditions that
it occurred. In other words, non-accidentalness is Nomicity, which charac-
terizes both extremely general regularities, like gravitational attraction, and
extremely specific ones, like the effect of a fox on a rabbit’s brain.
Recall that condition (ii) of DT required that information flow be ”fixed
by some law(s) of nature.” Among the dissents to DT I reviewed above, Mil-
likan’s was particularly critical of (ii), but the others also at least tacitly
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rejected it in favor of some weaker-sounding non-accident condition. I agree
that we should reject (ii) for the reason Millikan offered; there are not laws
concerning many things involved in interesting cases of information trans-
mission, like that between a fox and a rabbit’s brain. But there are Nomic
relationships between foxes and rabbit organs. Requiring that informational
relations be Nomic therefore does not imply an unacceptably strict view
about what informational relations exist.
I will now return to reconsider Factivity. I argue that, having recognized
the problematic strictness of DT is resolved by the replacing the appeal to
laws by an appeal to Nomicity, Factivity should not be abandoned.
4 Nomic, Factive Information
4.1 Mistake Cases and Factivity
To briefly reiterate, condition (i) in DT says that if b’s being in state N carries
information about s ’s being in state F, then the probability of s ’s being in
state F, conditional on b’s being in state N, is 1. Less technically, DT says
that b’s being N indicates that, in fact, s is F. I outlined several accounts
that reject this condition partly on the basis of considering cases involving
mistakes. That is, these accounts take the observation that information-
users make mistakes to count in favor of a non-Factive view of information.
However, this reasoning is critically flawed. To illustrate, I consider the
following two variants of the case of Fleeing Rabbit:
A. A pattern of air-vibration caused by a stalking fox reaches a nearby
rabbit’s ears and causes a brain state N in the rabbit. N then figures
in further brain processes that normally generate the rabbit’s fleeing
behavior, and it does flee.
B. A pattern of air-vibration caused by a fallen branch reaches a nearby
rabbit’s ears and causes a brain-state M in the rabbit. M then figures
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in the same processes as in (A), and the rabbit flees. No predator is
nearby.
Let us stipulate that the pattern of air-vibration at the rabbit’s ear and
its brain activity are exactly similar in terms of their local physical proper-
ties. So, everything after the fox’s step is indistinguishable from everything
after the branch’s landing - that is, indistinguishable from the perspective of
a well-positioned observer who has superbly high-resolution devices for dis-
tinguishing patterns of air-vibration and rabbit brain activity. This means
that N and M are constituted by the same rates of neural firing in the same
neurons, which figure in the same larger brain processes in a rabbit with
the same learning history, and the rabbit’s sense organs receive the same
impinging pattern of energy.
Allow me to reconstruct the line of reasoning that I take to be the com-
mon objection to DT. To start, we can assume N carries predator-related
information, since we are assuming the information in N supports ascribing
predator-related intentional content to the rabbit. Now add the following
premise; N and M must carry exactly the same information. One might
think this premise is supported by the similarity between N and M that I
just stipulated, or simply by observed similarity in rabbit behavior across
(A) and (B). That is, one might think that the sameness of what happens
locally around the rabbit brain implies that N and M must be information-
carriers of the same basic type. If this were right and N and M do have the
same information content, then M must carry predator-related information
even in the absence of a predator, since N does. Thus, the non-Factivity of
information would follow.
However, the stipulated similarities between N and M do not entail that
they carry the same information. Physical shape and local causal relations
do not fully specify information content, because they do not exhaust Nomic
relations. The rabbit’s brain activity is Nomically related to innumerable
parts of the world the rabbit lives in, ranging widely in temporal and spatial
scale. What happens in the rabbit’s brain and nearby its sense organs is an
infinitesimal portion of all of the Nomic regularities that involve the brain
activity described by N and M. By assumption, the two brain states have
different causal relations to moderately distal objects - a fox and a fallen
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branch - so there are some things N is Nomically related to which M is
not, and vice versa. In short, one could say that the two brain states are
Nomically differentiable. This suggests N and M should be differentiable in
terms of the information they carry.
Here it may be worth emphasizing the assumed naturalness of informa-
tion. Recall that the non-Factive alternatives to DT discussed above share
with Dretske the idea that it is not observed or perceived correlations that
determine information content - that would leave us with a vicious circularity
when it came to using information flows to explain the content of observations
or perceptions. Rather, information inheres in the counterfactually robust
structure of the physical world itself - in Nomic correlations as opposed to
accidental ones. Since Fleeing Rabbit (A) and (B) do not describe Nomically
identical situations, the sense in which N and M might be classified as states
of the ”same type” cannot be just based in their Nomic properties.
Recognizing the way Nomic regularities involve initial conditions, replac-
ing DT’s condition (ii) with a Nomicity requirement supports a distinction
between information flows across Fleeing Rabbit (A) and (B). We can assume
that under some (relatively narrow) initial conditions, N does guarantee the
presence of a fox, and that M is not subsumed under that same Nomic reg-
ularity because it occurs outside of those initial conditions. This points to
how vast and diverse are the arrays of Nomic regularities involving N and M,
and how inadequate local similarity is as a measure of informational similar-
ity. Understanding information to come with all Nomic relations yields an
extremely inclusive (not strict) view of information, which both resolves one
of DT’s main problems and provides the means of distinguishing N and M
in terms of the information they carry. This undercuts the reasoning behind
the non-Factive approaches above.
Thinking back to Figure 1 (p.5) and supposing we observe b’s being N (or
M ) in the Fleeing Rabbit’s case, we can see that the information content is
given by the distribution of possibilities at the information source, s ’s being
F. This source can be any probabilistically complementary set of events that
N (or M) is Nomically connected to. So b’s being N presumably carries
information about the presence of a fox, about patterns of air movement in
the rabbit’s ear, about the presence of a working rabbit brain, about the
presence of a life-sustaining planet, and much, much more. Each measurable
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quantity of information can be specified with respect to the initial conditions
of one or another Nomic regularity that N stands in. This extremely inclusive
view of the Nomic basis of information fits with the pre-theoretical idea
that information, understood as a natural, objective commodity, is what a
hypothetical observer could learn from a signal, where such a hypothetical
observer might occupy any perspective we can imagine. So, such an observer
might be interested in any s, described in any manner of F -ness, G-ness, etc.,
that stands in any Nomic relation to b’s being N. Therefore when we speak of
”the information” that some neural activity carries - all the information - we
are speaking of an incomprehensibly huge and diverse multitude of things,
each involving some Nomic regularity given some initial conditions.
Since N and M cannot be classified as states of the ”same type” just in
terms of their inherent informational properties, what might justify their be-
ing classified together? Well, they appear to play the same role in a complex
system that generates Rabbit-fleeing behavior. One might therefore think
that, despite having different informational properties simpliciter, N and M
carry the same information relevant to how that behavior is generated. If
true, this would support the non-Factive approach on a line of reasoning
much like the one I rebutted above. However, note that this requires a shift
from the question of ”what information is there” to the question of ”what
information is relevant” (for understanding some phenomenon of interest).
The latter question just states the reference class problem in terms of possible
sources of information. That is, to classify N and M as relevant-information-
carriers of the same type involves selecting probabilistically complementary
sets (a reference class) that specifies the kind of transmission or the ”chan-
nel” we are interested in, and disregards myriad other information flows that
occur in Fleeing Rabbit (A) and (B). Thus, classifying N and M together
assumes an answer to the reference class problem that makes them relevant
in the same way.
If one selects a reference class that roughly reflects the epistemic position
and interests of an individual human, one will readily identify informational
similarities between N and M. That is, across the various contexts in which
we would observe a rabbit brain, N and M would look, to use, like the
same kind of state - we could learn the same sorts of things from each.
For instance, we could learn from each that the rabbit is about the exhibit
predator-avoidance behavior. But referring to what we can tell apart brings
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our own reference frame into the picture, so to speak. It smuggles our own
intentionality into what is ultimately supposed to help explain how a brain,
body, and environment interact to give rise to intentionality. The assumption
of a human observer-centric reference class in a theory of natural informa-
tion is therefore illicit. To define information in a way that makes N and
M information-carriers of the same kind would be to relativize information
to human intentionality and give up any hope of explaining the nature of
intentionality in terms of information.
Non-Factivity does not resolve the reference class problem; which back-
ground data or natural correlations are relevant is not, in general, a trans-
parent matter. By one measure, non-Factivity makes the reference class
problem worse, since one needs to specify both the kinds of entities involved
(brain activity, b and certain environmental features, s) and the populations
of instances of those entities that fix the probabilistic information content.
Of the many things N carries information about, we need some reason to
hone in on fox-ness, and also a reason to hone in on the particular distribu-
tion of foxes and non-foxes on which the conditional probability of N versus
not-N provides the information content. Non-Factivity is therefore not well-
motivated as a response to DT’s problems.
By my lights the move to non-Factivity loses touch with the agenda of
understanding thinking processes naturalistically, adopting an assumption
about relevant reference classes that relies on the intentionality of human
investigators. This suggests the non-Factive views are better seen as theories
of non-Natural information. In many contexts, where a certain investigative
perspective can properly be taken for granted, these theories might be quite
useful. But in the context of defining information as it figures in the expla-
nation of how intentionality arises in nature, one needs to give due attention
to the reference class problem, on pain of vicious circularity.
Stating the reference class problem in terms of the question ”what infor-
mation is relevant...?” should make clear that the solution to this problem is
not to be sought in information-theoretic terms. The similarity between (A)
and (B) is not just a matter of what information enters the rabbit brain, but
is rather something about some of the information there. This ”something”
is what makes the predator-related information relevant, it tells us which
classes of rabbit brain-states and Nomically related environmental events we
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are interested in, and it is not something that a good theory of information
should capture.
Importantly, the relevance-fixing similarity between (A) and (B) could be
a feature of processes that N and M figure in despite carrying different
information. In other words, whatever solves the reference class problem
could explain why M does something like N even though the latter carries
Factive information about a fox and the former does not. There is significant
precedent for relying on a notion of function for to this end. Later Dretske
(1988) and many of his interlocutors rely on a notion of biological functions
as selected by evolution or learning [13,14,16,27–29]. Whether and how this
idea can be coherently spelled out is beyond scope here. But supposing it is
the fact that N and M serve the same function and that this satisfactorily
accounts for what is the same across (A) and (B), there is nothing problematic
about M carrying different (and also Factive) information from N, as long as
M functions in the same way as N despite this informational difference. If it
is how the information is used by a larger system that settles reference class
issues, it is reasonable to think the rabbit uses (Factive) information about
a predator in (A), whereas in (B) the rabbit uses M as if it carried that
information, though it does not. It could be that the complex of perceptual
and motor processes that go into defining the function of N are such that
(Factive) information about the movement of the air (or some other proxy
for F ) is used as if it were information about a predator.
It is not obvious that a theory of function and the implicated notion of
selection evolution or learning will ultimately allow one to make sense of
intentionality in naturalistic terms, but my focus here is on understanding
information, assuming information is to figure in that explanatory project.
Since resources from outside of information theory are needed to determine
reference classes anyway, adopting a non-Factive view of information is con-
fused as an attempt to deal with cases like (A) and (B).
4.2 Nomic, Factive Information and Probability
My analysis here suggests processes of perception and intentional action are
to be partly understood in terms of information flows within a nervous sys-
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tem and its environs, acknowledging that it is a substantive task to identify,
in general, which information flows are relevant to understanding those in-
tentional processes. This is to acknowledge that the reference class problem
cannot be resolved with just information-theoretic tools. Recognizing the
extreme heterogeneity of Nomic regularities and attendant initial conditions,
a Nomic and Factive notion of natural information can serve this broad ex-
planatory goal. I define Nomic, Factive Information (NFI) as follows:
NFI: b’s being in state N carries the information that
s is F if and only if (i) s is F, and (ii) the covariation of
b’s being in state N with s ’s being in state F is Nomic.
NFI is similar to DT, but it is distinct in two important ways. First, in in-
corporates the notion of Nomicity I articulated above, and therefore does not
exhibit DT’s strictness problem. Second, NFI makes no explicit reference to
probability. The requirement of Factivity entailed by DT’s condition (i) can
be readily expressed without mentioning probability, as I have just done in
NFI’s conditions (i). I suspect that Dretske’s appeal to conditional probabil-
ities (of 1) has been a cause of confusion in this discourse, because it suggests
that the most straightforward way to address DT’s strictness problem is to
lower the required probability to something less than 1. As I argued, DT’s
reliance on Laws of Nature is really what leads to the strictness problem.
Because NFI makes no explicit reference to probabilities, one might worry
that this notion of information has nothing to do with probability or un-
certainty. That would be an incongruous result, given the Shannon-Weiner-
inspired roots of this information-based approach to explaining intentional
phenomena. However, NFI is still essentially a matter of uncertainty in that
the measure of information carried by some event depends on what happens
in counterfactual scenarios. That is, given that N carries information that
s is F, the amount of this information depends on how probable it is that
s would have been F (rather than G, H, etc) in the case that b were not N
(but rather O, P, etc.) If s ’s being F is quite common across all possibilities
for b, then b’s being N does not carry much information about s ’s being F.
For instance, something indicating that a friend has not won the lottery is
a signal with a meager sum of information, whereas a signal indicating they
did win would have a much higher measure of information.
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Having a measure of the strength of informational relations is important;
one wants to be able to distinguish between signals that are informative as
to the same fact but to different degrees. A signal that a friend did not win
the lottery does not say how many tickets they bought, and one might want
to treat the friend differently depending on how many tickets they bought.
So probabilities are important to information, but this is quite different from
treating information content itself as probabilistic. Nomic, Factive Informa-
tion can be given such a formal measure - it coheres with the Shannon-Weiner
theory just fine. On the view I have defended, probabilities decide how much
information is transmitted between signals in a given channel, and the ex-
istence of alternative possibilities (counterfactuals) that are probabilistically
related is essential to all information signals, but the content of an informa-
tion signal is not probabilistic - the content is fixed by what the Nomically
related facts are.
5 Conclusion
Natural information is an indispensable idea for much theoretical work in
science; one can hardly do without the idea that some events reduce uncer-
tainty as to the occurrence of other events just as a matter of the inherent
physical properties of these events. Natural information plays an especially
prominent role in work that tries to shed light on the way physical systems
can exhibit intentional processes - how one can have perceptions and moti-
vations, for instance. Dretske’s (1981) account of natural information is a
useful jumping-off point for thinking about the philosophical issues involved,
as its insights have been highly influential while certain of its shortcomings
have been widely appreciated. However, the prevailing critical response to
that account misunderstands exactly how it falls short, blurring together the
problem of strictness with the problem of settling references classes. Settling
references classes is necessary to draw a link between successful and unsuc-
cessful ways of using information, and rejecting Dretske’s Factivity condition
does not help with this. Rather, the move to non-Factivity obfuscates and
postpones the reference class problem, relying on the false assumption that
locally similar states that play a similar explanatory role in behavior must
carry the same information.
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I have argues that an adequate understanding of natural information re-
quires two main modifications to Dretske’s (1981) view. First, carefully
considering what it is for a correlation between physical events to be non-
accidental, one should drop DT’s reliance on Laws of Nature in favor of the
much more inclusive idea of Nomicity. Second, one should recognize that
the reference class problem - which must be solved if one is to derive inten-
tional content partly from informational content - demands resources from
outside of information theory. This means recognizing a basic limit on what
information-theoretic tools can do to tell us about the content of perceptions,
motivations, and other intentional processes. Appropriately combined with
some other approach to the reference class problem, Nomic Factive Informa-
tion can support an understanding of naturally occurring intentionality.
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